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Human cognition does not take place in a social vacuum. When a par-
ticular incident becomes cognitively "available," it is because of social in-
fluences. Individuals are especially averse to losses; but how do we know
whether we are facing a loss or instead a foregone gain? What is the status
quo from which losses are measured? Social understandings provide the
answer. Individuals often think and work in groups; do group interactions
aggravate or reduce some of the harmful effects of heuristics and biases?'
If heuristics and biases sometimes lead people to make bad decisions, in a
way that seems to justify paternalism, the flow of information is a crucial
reason. Can anything be done-by individuals, government, or the law-to
improve information flow and perhaps to ensure "debiasing" in the process?
Or consider the fact that people care about fairness and are willing to pun-
ish, at their own expense, those who behave unfairly. 2 How might social in-
fluences reduce or increase people's willingness to sacrifice their material
self-interest for the sake of fairness?
My goal in this Essay is to suggest that we will have a far better under-
standing of the relationship between behavioral economics and law if we
investigate the connection between behavioral findings and social influ-
ences. The real-world effects of heuristics and biases are very much a func-
tion of social pressures, including, but not limited to, the law. Well-
organized private groups, showing a working knowledge of behavioral eco-
nomics and a willingness to exploit it for their benefit, play a central role
here. But to say this is to get ahead of the story. Begin with an example.
A. Snipers
In fall 2002, a pair of snipers killed ten people in the Washington, D.C.
area. The victims were randomly chosen. They included men and women,
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law School and De-
partment of Political Science. I am grateful to Caryn Campbell for superb research assistance.
I For evidence, see Norbert Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996).
2 See RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE 21 (1992).
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young and old, whites and African Americans. Each of these murders was
a tragedy, of course, but the actions of the snipers affected millions of oth-
ers as well. Many citizens were afraid that they would be next. Fear, some-
times dull and sometimes very sharp, seemed to grip much of the area, and
it significantly affected the behavior of D.C.-area residents. "What has
seized the capital of the world's only superpower in fear, the real palpable
fear that causes people to wear bullet-proof vests to pump gas and football
teams to practice indoors, is a sniper with an assault rifle."
3
Consider the following manifestations of this fear:
* Many school districts placed their classes under a "code blue," which
means that students must stay inside school buildings and cannot leave
campus for lunches or outdoor activities; nearly one million children
were affected.
4
* October SAT testing at several area schools was canceled.'
" Recreation league soccer for six-year olds, high school girls' tennis
and field hockey, and baseball, were all canceled or postponed.
6
" In Winchester, Virginia, all school field trips were canceled.
7
" The Glory Days Grill Invitational Bull Run in Manassas, Virginia, a
track meet that attracts over 2,000 runners, was canceled.
8
" About fifty area Starbucks stores removed their outside seating.
9
" The Prince George's County school system canceled all athletic events
indefinitely.' 0
" The D.C. Stoddert Soccer League, with more than 5,000 players, ages
four to nineteen, called off games; youth leagues in Maryland and Vir-
ginia were told to follow the lead of the school systems, most of which
canceled outdoor events.II
" Many people stopped going to health clubs with large front windows,
and some took to wearing body armor while pumping gas or shielding
themselves with a car door to keep safe. 1
2
3 "Focused on Iraq While Sniper Instills Terror," Letter to Editor, INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster,
Pa.), Oct. 22, 2002.
4 Erik Brady, Weekend Falls Victim to Sniper Fears, USA TODAY, Oct. 13, 2002, at Al, available





9 Parents Wary amid Manhunt for Killer Sniper, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002- 10-08-sniper-shootingsx.htm.
10 Manny Fernandez & Debbi Wilgoren, Few Will Play in Snipers Shadow, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,
2002, at Al.
IIId.
12 Ellen Sorokin et al., Everyone Is a Victim of the Sniper, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at B I.
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But there is something very odd about the extraordinary effects of the
snipers' actions. For people in the relevant area, the snipers caused a min-
iscule increase in risk. If there were five million people in the D.C. area,
and if the snipers were going to kill one person every three days, the daily
statistical risk of being shot was less than one in one million, and the
weekly statistical risk was less than three in one million. These are trivial
risks, far lower than the risks associated with many daily activities about
which people do not express even the slightest concern. The daily risk, for
example, was smaller than the risk of death from drinking thirty diet sodas
with saccharin, from driving one hundred miles, from smoking two ciga-
rettes, from ten airline trips, from living in a home with a smoker for two
weeks, from living in Denver rather than Philadelphia for forty days, and
from eating thirty-five slices of fresh bread.' 3 It would be possible to quib-
ble with my assessment of the statistical risk, and perhaps people, at the
time, rationally thought that the risk was somewhat higher than I have sug-
gested. But even if so, the real risk could not possibly have been sufficient
to justify the high levels of anxiety and fear, which bordered, for many, on
the edge of hysteria. Perhaps some of the defensive behavior was rational,
given the fact that that behavior itself was not terribly costly. But the extent
of alarm could not possibly be justified by the extent of the risk.
Why, then, did so many people in Washington feel fear and alter their
behavior in the midst of the snipers' attacks? Behavioral economics suggests
two principal accounts. First, people rely on the availability heuristic. Under
the availability heuristic, people assess probabilities by asking whether ex-
amples readily come to mind.' 4 Lacking statistical information, people sub-
stitute an easy question (Can I think of illustrations?) for a hard question
(What realities do the data actually show?). It is hardly irrational to use the
availability heuristic when reliable information is absent. But the availability
heuristic can lead to significant mistakes. If an incident is readily available
but statistically rare, the heuristic will lead to overestimation of risk; if exam-
ples do not come to mind, but the statistical risk is high, the heuristic can give
people an unjustified sense of security. Perhaps the fear of sniper attack, in
the Washington area, arose from a misperception of probability, generated by
the high salience of the few attacks and thus by the availability heuristic. ' 5
This explanation seems to have considerable power. But there is an-
other explanation. When strong emotions are triggered, people tend to fo-
cus on the worst case and not to think much about issues of probability at
13 RICHARD WILSON & EDMUND CROUCH, RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 208-09, 225 (2001). The risk
of living in Denver comes from slightly elevated radiation levels; the risk from eating fresh bread comes
from formaldehyde.
14 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 38, 46-49 (Hal R. Arkes & Ken-
neth R. Hammond eds., 1986).
15 In this light, we can see that terrorists show a good working knowledge of that heuristic.
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all. 16 The phenomenon of probability neglect occurs when people are highly
responsive to the outcome and when significant variations in its likelihood do
not much affect thought and behavior.' 7 Affect-rich outcomes, involving in-
tense emotions, are likely to produce probability neglect.' 8 To say the least,
the idea of being killed by a sniper, at a gas station or on a playground, is af-
fect-rich, especially in a period in which newspapers and television stations
focus their attention on the actual murders. Many of those who altered their
behavior in response to the killings appeared not to use the availability heuris-
tic to conclude that the probability of an attack was significant, but instead to
focus on the bad outcome and to neglect probability altogether.
B. The Social Element
It is therefore reasonable to explain the effects of the sniper attacks by
reference to some combination of the availability heuristic and probability
neglect.' 9 But an account of this kind, focusing solely on individual cogni-
tion, seems to be missing something important. Countless risks are, in prin-
ciple, "available," and countless risks might, in principle, have the kind of
salience that would lead to probability neglect. In many communities, the
risks associated with unsafe sex, which kills tens of thousands of Americans
each year,20 lack much salience. But in other communities, those risks are sa-
lient indeed. In many communities, the risks associated with tobacco smok-
ing (a killer of hundreds of thousands of Americans annually) 2' are not salient
at all; in many other communities, those risks are entirely available. The
dangers associated with nuclear power are available to Americans, but much
less so to citizens of France, who are largely unconcerned about those risks.22
Americans do not much fear the risks associated with genetic modification of
food, even though in principle, such risks might be "available. '23 Obviously
the availability of risks, and the risks to which probability neglect attaches, are
variable from place to place. Abandoned hazardous waste sites were not a sali-
ent source of risk until about 1980, when the Love Canal controversy converted
16 Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affec-
tive Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001) (finding that when emotions are triggered,
variations in probability matter relatively little).
17 See Cass R. Sunstein, Probabilit
, 
Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61,
61-76 (2002).
18 See Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 16, at 187-89.
19 Other factors might be at work, involving the new, unfamiliar, and apparently uncontrollable na-
ture of the risk. See PAUL SLOVtC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (Ragnar E. L6fstedt ed., 2000).
20 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 8 (2002).
21 Id.
22 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 683, 712 (1999).
23 See ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKET 114-21 (2000) (discussing incidents that
might be publicized widely and to an extent have been).
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such sites into a strong basis of concern.24 Availability thus varies over time.
Some statistically large risks do not cause a great deal of fear. Why is this?
The question suggests what is missing from the behavioral account: an
assessment of the social and cultural dimensions of judgment under uncer-
tainty.25 In behavioral work, researchers usually investigate individuals'
thinking through laboratory experiments in which subjects answer questions
in isolation. To say the least, these experiments are highly illuminating, and
they tell us a great deal about how people think and act in the real world.
26
What I mean to emphasize here is that for every finding in behavioral eco-
nomics, there is an accompanying set of social interactions, which greatly
influence people's beliefs and judgments.
This is most obviously true for availability. In many cases of high-
visibility, low-probability risks, including sniper attacks, shark attacks, and
the kidnapping of young girls, the sources of availability are not obscure.
The mass media focus on those risks; people communicate their fear and
concern to one another; the widespread fear and concern increase media at-
tention; and the spiral continues until people move on. This account ex-
plains how the "risk of the month" syndrome stems from the interaction
between availability and social influences. Much of the time, however,
what is available and salient to some is not available and salient to all. For
example, many people focus on cases in which the government neglected to
regulate some environmental risk, with the consequence being widespread
illness and death. 27 To such people, the available incidents require strong
precautions in the face of uncertainty. But many other people focus on
cases in which the government overreacted to weak science, engaging in
large expenditures for little gain in terms of health, safety, or environmental
protection. 28 To such people, the available incidents justify a measure of
circumspection and restraint in the face of uncertainty. Which of these
cases will be available and to whom?
In any case people have different predispositions. These predisposi-
tions play a large role in determining which of the numerous possibilities is
salient. Availability helps to determine beliefs, to be sure, but beliefs help
to determine availability as well. Both beliefs and availability are endoge-
nous to one another. When social and cultural forces interact with salience
to produce concern about one set of problems, but not another, predisposi-
tions are crucial. On this count, too, those interested in behavioral econom-
ics have said relatively little.
24 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 691-98.
25 On the cultural issues, see MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).
26 See Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES 288 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
27 See THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY
WARNINGS (Poul Harremoes et al. eds., 2001).
28 See AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? (1995).
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In order to predict behavior, to see how law can accomplish shared
goals, and to analyze the legitimate role of paternalism in law, it is neces-
sary to know something about how social forces interact with individual
cognition. Indeed, law can sometimes amplify the relevant effects-as, for
example, through a rapid, aggressive response to a salient risk, a response
that makes the risk more salient still. If public officials focus on a risk, they
can use the underlying cognitive processes to increase social concern.
While I focus throughout this Essay on the availability heuristic and on
probability neglect, it should be easy to see that social influences amplify
many other features of individual cognition. Alert politicians and well-
organized private groups can manipulate loss aversion. Anchoring greatly
affects people's judgments; in the face of uncertainty, people often seize on
any number, or "anchor," that is available.29 But on which number will
they anchor? Social influences, including those imposed by lawyers, play a
large role in answering that question. 0 Fairness matters, but the beliefs and
actions of others greatly affect people's judgments about fairness.3 In em-
phasizing these points, I mean to suggest the importance of seeing various
cognitive findings in the context of social dynamics, including self-
conscious manipulations of the flow of information.
II. AVAILABILITY AND PROBABILITY NEGLECT
In this Part, I briefly describe the availability heuristic and probability ne-
glect and their relationship to risk-related law. I do so partly because they are
important in their own right, and not much discussed in this Symposium, but
mostly by way of preface for the discussion of social influences.
A. Availability
Begin with the availability heuristic. When presented with hard ques-
tions, people often ask themselves easier questions, which serve to simplify
their inquiry. 32 The answer to the easier questions operates as a heuristic or
a rule of thumb. Of these rules of thumb, the availability heuristic is proba-
bly the most important for purposes of understanding law, and in particular,
those aspects of law that involve both discrimination and social risks. 33
29 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judg-
ments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
3 I d. at 137.
31 Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dic-
tator Game, 107 ECON. J. 1465, 1468-70 (1997).
32 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited- Attribute Substitution in Intui-
tive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 29, at 49;
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1518-19 (1998).
33 On the availability heuristic in general, see Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 14, at 38, 46-49. On the
availability heuristic and law, see Roger Noll & James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747,767-71 (1991); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 703-05.
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Thus, for example, "a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear
more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less re-
trievable. '34 The point very much bears on private and public responses to
risks, suggesting, for example, that people will be especially responsive to
the dangers of AIDS, crime, earthquakes, and nuclear power plant accidents
if examples are easy to recall.35 The point also explains some of the sources
of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age, and disability. If it is easy
to bring to mind cases in which a female employee quit work to care for her
family, sex discrimination is more likely; so too if it is easy to think of
cases in which African-American employees performed poorly. 36
In this way, familiarity can affect the availability of examples, but sali-
ence is important as well. "The impact of seeing a house burning on the
subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater than the impact
of reading about a fire in the local paper. '37 Similarly, earlier events will
have a smaller impact than later ones. This point helps explain much of
human behavior. For example, whether people will buy insurance for natu-
ral disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences. 38 If floods have not
occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood plains are far less
likely to purchase insurance. 39 In the aftermath of an earthquake, many
more people buy insurance for earthquakes, but the number declines stead-
ily from that point, as vivid memories recede. 40 For purposes of law and
regulation, the problem is that the availability heuristic can lead to serious
errors of fact, in terms of both excessive controls on small risks that are
cognitively available and insufficient controls on large risks that are not.41
Notice that the use of the availability heuristic in these contexts strongly
suggests that the heuristics operate even when the stakes are large. And it is
even possible that the use of the availability heuristic, in such contexts, is
fully rational for people who lack statistical knowledge. Perhaps use of that
heuristic is the best way of minimizing the sum of decision and error costs.
But it seems less useful to debate the rationality of the availability heuristic
than simply to observe that it has a significant effect on actual behavior.
34 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 14, at 46.
35 See SLOVIC, supra note 19, at 37-38.
36 1 speculate that the availability heuristic helps explain the striking results in Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Brendan More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Ex-
periment on Labor Market Discrimination 11-23 (Nov. 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (finding that otherwise identical job applicants are less likely to spur employer interest if their
first name seems likely to be that of an African-American). The representativeness heuristic might also
be playing a role. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 32, at 60-63 (discussing the representative-
ness heuristic).
37 SLOVIC, supra note 19, at 37-48.
38 Id. at 39-40.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 703-05; SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 33-35, 78-98.
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What, in particular, produces availability? An interesting study at-
tempts to test the effects of ease of imagery on perceived judgments of
risk.42 The study asked subjects to read about an illness (Hyposcenia-B)
that "was becoming increasingly prevalent" on the local campus. In one
condition, the symptoms were concrete and easy to imagine: muscle aches,
low energy, and frequent severe headaches. In another condition, the symp-
toms were vague and hard to imagine: an inflamed liver, a malfunctioning
nervous system, and a vague sense of disorientation. Subjects under both
conditions were asked both to imagine a three-week period in which they
had the disease and to write a detailed description of what they imagined.
After doing so, subjects were asked to assess, on a ten-point scale, their
likelihood of contracting the disease. The basic finding was that likelihood
judgments were very different in the two conditions, with easily imagined
symptoms making people far more inclined to believe that they were likely
to get the disease.43
There are several implications for policy and law. The public demand
for law should be much higher if people can easily imagine the harm in
question-in such cases, the law might well reflect a kind of hysteria. But
if the harm is difficult to imagine, we might well see a pattern of neglect.44
We would therefore predict that easily imaginable harms would lead to rela-
tively greater private precautions and relatively greater governmental con-
cern. 45 Well-organized private groups should, and do, take advantage of
this fact, attempting to publicize visible examples of harms to which they
seek to draw attention.46 This point also offers implications about public in-
formational campaigns. If the government wants people to take protective
steps, it should provide information about symptoms in a vivid rather than
statistical way, relying on examples that can later be brought to mind.
An understanding of the availability heuristic bears directly on the debate
over paternalistic interventions. If people believe that some risks are much
higher than they actually are and that other risks are much lower than they ac-
tually are, their behavior will not promote their welfare. People will take ex-
cessive precautions to avoid trivial risks and they will fail to protect themselves
against genuine hazards. Government has a legitimate role to play here; at a
minimum, it should correct false beliefs. In some cases, government legiti-
42 Steven J. Sherman et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Con-
tracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 29, at 82.
43 Id. at 88.
44 Compare the finding that teens' rates of risk behaviors-smoking, driving after drinking, unsafe
sex-can be reduced by addressing heuristics and biases, in part by explaining that the availability heu-
ristic leads teens to overestimate the risk behavior of their peers. See Baruch Fischhoff, Heuristics and
Biases in Application, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 29, at 730, 747.
45 See Noll & Krier, supra note 33, at 767-71.
46 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 733-35 (discussing availability campaigns).
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mately responds to people's inability to process risk-related information by
constraining their choices, at least when the constraint ensures that they will do
what they would do if they were adequately informed. Here, as elsewhere, an
understanding of bounded rationality undermines the dogmatic, nearly theo-
logical, antipaternalism of those who indulge strong assumptions about ration-
ality, at least if social influences do not correct individual errors. 47
B. Probability Neglect
The availability heuristic can produce an inaccurate assessment of
probability. But sometimes people will attempt to make little assessment of
probability at all, especially when strong emotions are involved.4 8 In such
cases, large-scale variations in probabilities matter little, even when those
variations unquestionably should matter. The case of the sniper attacks is
an example. The point applies to hope as well as fear; vivid images of good
outcomes will crowd out consideration of probability too.49 Lotteries are
successful partly for this reason.
Probability neglect has received its most direct empirical confirmation
in a striking study of people's willingness to pay to avoid electric shocks.
50
The central purpose of the study was to test the relevance of probability in
"affect rich" decisions. One experiment investigated whether varying the
probability of harm would matter more, or less, in settings that trigger
strong emotions than in settings that seem relatively emotion-free. In the
relatively emotion-free setting, participants were told that the experiment
entailed some chance of a $20 penalty. In the "strong emotion" setting, par-
ticipants were asked to imagine that they would participate in an experiment
involving some chance of a "short, painful, but not dangerous electric
shock." 5' Participants were asked to say how much they would be willing
to pay to avoid participating in the relevant experiment. Some participants
were told that there was a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome (either
the $20 loss or the electric shock), others were told that the chance was
99%, and still others were told that the chance was 100%.
The key result was that variations in probability affected those facing
the relatively emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than they af-
fected people facing the more emotionally evocative outcome of an electric
shock.52 For the cash penalty, the difference between the median payment
for a 1% chance and the median payment for a 99% chance was predictably
large and indeed broadly consistent with economic rationality: $1 to avoid
47 For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism and the Law
6-8 (Feb. 20, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
48 Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 16, at 176-88.
49 See id.
50 Id.
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a 1% chance, and $18 to avoid a 99% chance.53 For the electric shock, by
contrast, the difference in probability made little difference to median will-
ingness to pay: $7 to avoid a 1% chance, and $10 to avoid a 99% chance.5 4
Apparently, people will pay a significant amount to avoid a small probability
of a hazard that is affect laden-and the amount that they will pay will not
vary greatly with changes in probability. My own study, involving arsenic,
comes to a similar conclusion, suggesting that people are less sensitive to dif-
ferences in probability when the risks are described in a way that triggers
strong emotions. 5 The point explains "why societal concerns about hazards
such as nuclear power and exposure to extremely small amounts of toxic
chemicals fail to recede in response to information about the very small prob-
abilities of the feared consequences from such hazards. 56
An understanding of probability neglect casts new light on the finding
that visualization or imagery matters a great deal to people's reactions to
risks.5 7 When an image of a bad outcome is easily accessible: people will
become greatly concerned about a risk, holding probability constant.58
Consider the fact that when people are asked how much they will pay for
flight insurance for losses resulting from "terrorism," they will pay more
than if they are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance to com-
pensate for injury or monetary losses from all causes.59 The evident expla-
nation for this peculiar result is that the word "terrorism" evokes vivid
images of disaster, thus crowding out probability judgments. Note also that
when people discuss a low-probability risk, their concern rises even if the
discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the
likelihood of harm really is infinitesimal.60 The reason is that the discus-
sion makes it easier to visualize the risk and hence to fear it.
Probability neglect does not involve the availability heuristic. That heuris-
tic leads people not to neglect probability, but to answer the question of prob-
ability by replacing a hard question (What is the statistical risk?) with an easy
question (Do salient examples readily come to mind?).6' My suggestion here is
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See Sunstein, supro note 17, at 77-81.
56 Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 29, at 397.
57 See Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using
Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000).
58 See George Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 275-76 (2001).
59 See E.J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993).
60 See Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship Be-
tween Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1085, 1094-95 (1994).
61 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
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not that visualization makes an event seem more probable (though this is also
true), but that visualization makes the issue of probability less relevant or even
irrelevant. The most sensible conclusion is that with respect to risks of injury
or harm, vivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can "crowd out" other
kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of disaster
is really small. "If someone is predisposed to be worried, degrees of unlikeli-
ness seem to provide no comfort, unless one can prove that harm is absolutely
impossible, which itself is not possible. '62 When people focus on highly
speculative risks, it is often because of intense emotional reactions that make
those risks, and not relevant others, stand out from the background.
III. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
All these points involve individual thinking about risks. But as I have
stressed, there is an unresolved puzzle for those interested in the real-world
effects of the availability heuristic and probability neglect: in many con-
texts, multiple images are literally available and potentially salient. "[N]ot
all analogies within a person's repertoire are equal: for whatever reasons,
some are more easily recalled than others. '63 Consider the problem of gun
violence. We can find cases in which the presence of guns led to many
deaths and also cases in which the presence of guns allowed law-abiding
citizens to protect themselves against criminals. 64 Or consider the question
of whether women, when facing a risk of sexual violence, increase or de-
crease their chances of escaping unscathed if they engage in aggressive self-
defense. In some cases, resistance prevented the assault. In other cases, re-
sistance led to murder.65 In the face of conflicting instances, which cases
are especially available? Even expert judgments appear to be driven by one
or another set of available instances. 66 But why should one or another kind
of case be available?
A. Cascades and Polarization
Social influences are quite important here. Sometimes availability and
salience spread through social bandwagons or cascades, in which apparently
representative anecdotes and gripping examples move rapidly from one per-
son to another.67 In fact, a process of this sort played a large role in the
62 JOHN WEINGART, WASTE IS A TERRIBLE THING TO MIND 362 (2001).
63 YUEN FOONG KHONG, ANALOGIES AT WAR 213 (1992).
64 See Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of
Gun-Risk Perceptions, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
65 See Fischhoff, supra note 44, at 730, 733-34.
66 Id.
67 Chip Heath et al., Emotional Selection in Memes: The Case of Urban Legends, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1028 (2001) [hereinafter Heath et al., Emotional Selection in Memes]; Chip Heath, Do
People Prefer To Pass Along Good or Bad News? Valence and Relevance as Predictors of Transmission
Propensity, 68 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 79 (1996). For a popular account of the related
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Washington area sniper attacks, in the Love Canal scare, 68 and in many
other sets of social processes producing law.
Consider a stylized illustration. Andrew hears of a social event, which
he finds to be revealing or illustrative. The event might involve crime, dis-
crimination, environmental hazards, or threats to national security. Andrew
tells Barry, who would be inclined to view the event as not terribly informa-
tive, but who comes to believe that the event does indeed reveal a great deal
after seeing Andrew's reaction. Once Carol hears about the event from An-
drew and Barry, she is likely to find it revealing as well. Deborah will then
have to possess a great deal of private information to reject the shared opin-
ion of Andrew, Barry, and Carol. 69  Stylized, though it is, the example
shows that once several people start to consider an example as probative,
many people may come to be influenced by their opinion, giving rise to
cascade effects.10 Nor is the example entirely unrealistic. Why do people
purchase insurance against natural disasters? Much of the explanation
comes from social interactions that follow vivid examples. 71
In the domain of social risks, availability cascades are responsible for
many social beliefs. The point is amplified by the fact that fear-inducing
accounts, with high emotional valence, are especially likely to spread.7 2
There is a general implication here. Because different social influences can
be found in different communities, local variations are inevitable, with dif-
ferent examples becoming salient in each. One community might greatly
fear abduction of young girls, and another might not, even though the statis-
tical risk is the same in each. One community might fear shark attacks, and
another might not, even though the likelihood of such an attack, in both
places, is miniscule. Such variations might involve coincidence or small or
random factors, rather than large-scale cultural differences.
Different judgments within different social groups, with different
available examples, owe their origin to social processes of this sort. Indeed
the different reactions to nuclear power in France and the United States can
be explained in large part in this way. Or suppose that some groups con-
centrate on cases in which guns increased violence, while others focus on
cases in which guns decreased violence. 73 When this is so, availability cas-
cades are a large part of the reason. "Many Germans believe that drinking
phenomenon of tipping points, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000); for a somewhat
more technical treatment, see DUNCAN WATTS, SIx DEGREES OF SEPARATION (2003).
68 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 691-98.
69 See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 188, 193-95 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995).
70 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 715-33; Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the
Behavior of Others, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998).
71 See Jacob Gersen, Strategy and Cognition: Regulating Catastrophic Risk (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
72 See Heath et al., Emotional Selection in Memes, supra note 67, at 1037.
73 See Braman & Kahan, supra note 64.
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water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that putting ice in soft
drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather enjoy a cold drink of wa-
ter after some cherries; and Americans love icy refreshments. '74 Availabil-
ity cascades help account for many diverse social judgments.
There is a closely related phenomenon. Processes of social deliberation
typically lead like-minded people to accept a more extreme version of the
views with which they began.75 This is the process known as group polariza-
tion. 76 If several people fear global warming, and speak to one another, their
fear is likely to increase as a result of internal discussions. If group members
believe that the United States cannot be trusted in its dealings with other na-
tions, that very belief is likely to be heightened after members have started to
talk. Group polarization has not been studied in connection with the avail-
ability heuristic. But the clear implication is that the effect of certain avail-
able examples will become greatly amplified through group discussion.
Suppose, for example, that several people are discussing a recent wave of
sniper attacks, or cases involving the kidnapping of young girls, or situations
in which the government has wrongly ignored a serious foreign threat.77 If
these particular examples are mentioned, they are likely to stick. And if the
group has a predisposition to think that one or another risk is serious, social
dynamics will lead the group to believe that the example is highly revealing.
The same is true if the group is fearful. An initial predisposition toward fear
is likely to be aggravated as a result of collective deliberations.78
In general, then, groups tend to polarize toward a more extreme position in
line with their predeliberation tendencies. This finding suggests that groups are
not likely to be able to avoid the judgment errors made by individuals. A great
deal of evidence suggests complex and mixed results on that question.79 With
respect to certain statistical problems, groups have been found to make better
decisions than individuals. 80 And in a finding of particular relevance here,
there is suggestive evidence that groups of randomly selected people, without
any particular predeliberation tendency, are slightly better at avoiding the prob-
lems created by use of the availability heuristic. 81 On the other hand, groups of
74 Joseph Henrich, Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOx 343, 353-54 (2001) (presenting an entertaining out-
line in connection with food choice decisions).
75 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 74-
95, on file with author); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
76 ld
77 See KHONG, supra note 63.
78 Compare the discussion of social influences and extremism in Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epis-
temology of Extremism, in POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND RATIONALITY 3 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 2002).
79 See Kerr et al., supra note 1, at 688-96.
80 ALAN BLINDER & JOHN MORGAN, ARE Two HEADS BETTER THAN ONE? AN EXPERIMENTAL
ANALYSIS OF GROUP VS. INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKING (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 7909, 2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7909.pdf.
81 Kerr et al., supra note 1, at 692.
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like-minded people, predisposed to show concern about some problem, are
likely to show amplified use of that heuristic. And some evidence suggests that
the use of the representativeness heuristic is aggravated in groups.82 Groups
seem to be more confident than individuals, but the evidence conflicts on
whether the greater confidence reflects overconfidence bias.83 The most com-
prehensive study suggests that "there can be no simple answer to the question,
'Which is more biased, individuals or groups?"' 84 It seems clear that group
processes do not eliminate the use of heuristics. It remains to be seen whether
and when they reduce or increase the resulting errors.85
B. Media, Interest Groups, and Politicians
Thus far the discussion has involved interactions among individuals,
who are all treated as equals. But it should be clear that in the real world,
some voices are more important than others, especially when availability and
salience are involved. In particular, the behavior and preoccupations of the
media play a large role. Many perceived "epidemics" are in reality no such
thing, but instead a product of overwhelming media coverage of gripping, un-
representative incidents.86 Attention to these unusual incidents is likely to en-
sure availability and salience, promoting an inaccurately high estimate of
probability and at the same time some degree of probability neglect. And in
the face of close media attention, the demand for legal responses will be sig-
nificantly affected. In the context of the sniper attacks, intense media cover-
age was the central source of social fear, helping to ensure that large amounts
of private and public resources were devoted to risk reduction.
A natural question, then, is why the media covers certain risks and not
others. A good clue comes from the following suggestion:
Whatever the criticisms, the reign of terror is boosting ratings for cable news net-
works. In fact, they are now at their highest levels since the Sept. 11, 2001, terror-
ist attacks. At the end of last week, Fox News Channel's average daily audience
was up 27% from a month before; CNN's was up 29%; MSNBC's, up 24%.87
Hence the media's coverage reflects its economic self-interest, at least in
part. Gripping instances, whether or not representative, are likely to attract
attention and to increase ratings. Often the result is to distort probability
judgments. There can be a kind of vicious circle involving the availability
heuristic and media incentives, with each aggravating the other, often to the
82 Id.
83 Id.
4 Id. at 715.
85 For evidence of group polarization on juries, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
How JURIES DECIDE 43-61 (2002).
86 See JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE 28 (1999).
97 Johanna Neuman, In a Sniper s Grip: Media's Role in Drama Debated (pt. 1), L.A. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2002, at 16.
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detriment of public understanding.
Knowing the importance of media coverage, well-organized private
groups-some entirely self-interested and others altruistic and pursuing a
social cause-often work extremely hard to promote public attention to par-
ticular risks. A common tactic is to publicize an incident that might trigger
both availability and salience. Of course terrorists themselves are the most
extreme and vicious example, using high-visibility attacks to convince peo-
ple that "they cannot be safe anywhere." 88 But many illustrations are less
objectionable and sometimes even benign. Consider the abandoned haz-
ardous waste problem at Love Canal, used by environmental groups to
promote hazardous waste cleanup,8 9 or the Exxon Valdez disaster, used by
the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations to promote more
stringent safeguards against oil spills. Showing at least a working knowl-
edge of the availability heuristic and other behavioral findings, private
groups seize on selected incidents and publicize them to make them gener-
ally salient to the public. With respect to tort reform, corporate advocates
use extreme and unrepresentative cases of jury misconduct to suggest that
significant protections are needed against jury overreaching.9" In all of
these examples, the use of particular instances might be necessary to move
the public, and legislators, in the right directions. Certainly the social proc-
esses that interact with salience and availability can promote legal reform
where it is needed. But there are no assurances here. Social influences
might well lead people to exaggerate a problem or a probability, or to ig-
nore the question of probability altogether.
Politicians engage in the same basic project. President Ronald Reagan
was a master. Consider his influential discussion of the Chicago Welfare
Queen, "a heavy woman driving a big white Cadillac and paying for thick
steaks with wads of food stamps." 91 By its very nature, the voice of an in-
fluential politician comes with amplifiers. When public officials are able to
bring an incident before the public, a seemingly illustrative example is
likely to spread far and wide. A legal enactment can itself promote avail-
ability; if the law responds to the problems associated with hazardous waste
dumps or "hate crimes," people might well come to see those problems as
readily available. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would inevi-
88 See Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY (forthcoming
2003).
89 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 691-98.
90 Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us "About Jury Be-
havior and the Tort System, 28 SUFF. U. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (1994) (referring to "the fabricated or mis-
leading anecdote"). There are a number of such anecdotes, but probably the one most cited is about the
jury that rendered a million-dollar verdict in the case of a woman who allegedly lost her psychic powers
after undergoing a CAT scan. This story apparently originated in 1985 in a speech by an insurance
company executive.
91 Steven Roberts, Food Stamps Program: How It Grew and How Reagan Wants To Cut It Back,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1981, § 1, at 11.
1309
97:1295 (2003)
HeinOnline  -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1309 2002-2003
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tably loom large no matter what President George W. Bush chose to em-
phasize. But notice that the President, and his White House generally, re-
ferred to the attacks on countless occasions, frequently in order to stress the
reality of seemingly distant threats and the need to incur significant costs
and burdens to counteract them. We know too little to know if the govern-
ment's emphasis on those attacks reflected, or bred, a form of probability
neglect. But there is no doubt that their salience played a large role in af-
fecting political behavior and that that role cannot be understood without
reference to social influences.
C. Predispositions
But all this does not provide the full picture. Beliefs and orientations
are a product of availability, to be sure, and social influences help to ensure
both availability and salience. But what is available is also a product of an-
tecedent beliefs and orientations, both individual and social. In other
words, availability is endogenous to, or a product of, individual predisposi-
tions. Almost no discussion has been devoted to this point in the behavioral
analysis of law.9
2
Consider some examples. Why do some people recall and emphasize
incidents in which a failure to take precautions led to serious environmental
harm? A likely reason is that they are predisposed to favor environmental
protection. And why do some people recall and emphasize incidents in
which environmental protection led to excessive costs for little gain? A
likely reason is that they are predisposed to oppose environmental controls.
Here is an interaction between the availability heuristic and confirmation
bias, which is "the tendency to seek information to confirm our original hy-
potheses and beliefs. '93 President Reagan's tale of the Welfare Queen was
especially salient to those who were predisposed to believe that the welfare
system was rewarding people who should be required to work, but tried to
cheat the system. To many others, the tale would fall on deaf ears and not
prove memorable at all (except perhaps as an illustration of unfortunate po-
litical rhetoric, or of an attempt to use the availability heuristic). The same
basic processes are at work in debates over gun control. When those suspi-
cious of such controls recall, and use, instances in which legal controls ac-
tually cost lives, predispositions are crucial.
94
The point should not be exaggerated. Predispositions are not a black
box, and they do not come from the sky. They have sources. Among their
sources are availability and salience. Hence there is a complex set of inter-
actions here, with heuristics helping to constitute predispositions, which are
in turn responsible for the real-world operation of heuristics. What I mean
to emphasize is that all this happens socially, not merely individually.
92 The exception is Braman & Kahan, supra note 64.
93 ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 147 (6th ed. 1992).
94 See Braman & Kahan, supra note 64.
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When people are in a group that is predisposed in a particular direction, the
salient examples will be quite different from those that are salient in a group
with an opposite predisposition. Here group polarization is especially im-
portant.
More generally, different cultural orientations play a large role in de-
termining what turns out to be available. 95 The United States is highly di-
verse, and for some purposes, it is plausible to think of different regions and
groups as having somewhat different cultures. Within the African-
American community, for example, the available instances are sometimes
quite different from those that can be found within the White community.96
Across nations, the differences are even more striking, in part because dif-
ferent world-views play such a dominant role.97
IV. BEYOND AVAILABILITY
I have emphasized the role of the availability heuristic and probability
neglect, but social influences are connected with the real-world effects of
many heuristics and biases and with the full range of findings in behavioral
economics. Consider, for example, one of the sources of unpredictability in
jury awards involving punitive damages or hard-to-monetize injuries: the
absence of a "modulus" that would enable people to make sense of various
"points" along the scale of dollars.98 When a company has engaged in seri-
ous misconduct, is the appropriate punishment $100,000, or $1,000,000, or
$10,000,000? A jury's judgment is likely to depend on the modulus that is
suggested by the most influential jurors. But where does that modulus, or
any modulus, come from? The answer lies in social understandings. Some-
times a particular juror will have heard of a case in which a certain amount
has been awarded, and that amount might turn out to serve as a modulus for
the group.
Social influences are not limited to this phenomenon. In a process akin
to group polarization, the dollar awards of juries turn out to be systemati-
cally higher than the predeliberation dollar awards of those juries' median
juror. 99 Dollar awards undergo a systematic "severity shift," ensuring that
in many cases, awards are as high as, or even higher than, that of the high-
est individual before deliberation began. Thus social interactions have a
predictable amplifying tendency on individual awards. An understanding
of individual psychology would be insufficient to predict this outcome. It is
necessary to examine social interactions as well. There is much to be
learned about the relationship between such interactions and anchoring.
95 See id.
96 See RONALD N. JACOBS, RACE, MEDIA, AND THE CRISIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY (2000).
97 See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABILITY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 53-72 (1985).
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Or consider loss aversion. People are averse to losses;100 but how do
we know whether something will count as a loss? When will people see
changes as losses? Often the answer depends not on simple facts, but on a
range of contextual factors, including how the event is framed. The status
quo is usually the reference point, so that losses are so defined when people
are asked, or forced, to relinquish what they now have. But simply through
inventive terminology, it is possible to manipulate the frame so as to make a
change appear to be a loss rather than a gain, or vice versa. These manipu-
lations occur socially-through the acts and deeds of other people and insti-
tutions. Consider a company that says "cash discount" rather than "credit
card surcharge." Or consider a parent who says that for behavior X, rather
than behavior Y, a child will be rewarded, as opposed to saying that for be-
havior Y, rather than behavior X, a child will be punished. Or consider fa-
miliar advertisements to the effect that "you cannot afford not to" use a
certain product.
In the context of environmental regulation, it is easy to manipulate the
reference point that people use to measures losses or gains. Thus
policymakers might claim that they are trying to "restore" water or air
quality as it was thirty years ago. If they make this claim, people are likely
to be receptive; they do not want air and water to be dirtier than they
recently were. By contrast, a proposal to "improve" air or water quality
will not be nearly so attractive. People's judgments are much affected by
whether we are speaking of restoration or improvement.0 1 But how can we
tell which is involved? The answer might be manipulated socially, simply
by picking a "clean" year to which policymakers seek to return. There is a
more general point. Because people are averse to losses from the status
quo, policymakers have a great deal to gain by manipulating people's
conception of what the status quo is, so that any changes do not seem to be
a "loss" at all. If an apparent increase in tax rates can really be described as
a return to tax rates in 1996, taxpayers are less likely to object. Such
manipulations, inevitably social in character, will inevitably have large
effects on assessments of legal alternatives.10 2
Or consider the finding of bounded self-interest, which behavioral
economists and those interested in behavioral law and economics have
stressed. 03 Bounded self-interest refers to the fact that people are some-
times willing to sacrifice material self-interest in order to be fair and also to
sacrifice material self-interest in order to punish unfairness. But what is the
difference between individual behavior and behavior in groups? The issue
has been studied in connection with the Dictator Game, used to explore
100 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and LegalAnalysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
101 See Robin Gregory et al., The Role of Past States in Determining Reference Points for Policy
Decisions, 55 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISIONS PROCESSES 195 (1993).
102 Id
103 See THALER, supra note 2, at 50-62; Jolls et al., supra note 32, at 1489-93.
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selfishness and altruism. 10 4 In this game, a subject is told that she can allo-
cate a sum of money, say $10, between herself and some stranger. The
standard economic prediction is that most subjects will keep all or almost
all of the money for themselves. But the standard prediction turns out to be
wrong. Most people choose to keep somewhere between $6 and $8 and to
share the rest. 10 5 The question here, however, is how behavior in the Dicta-
tor Game is affected if people are placed in teams-if people decide in
groups rather than individuals. Are groups more altruistic than individuals?
The answer is that team members choose still more equal divisions.
1 16
Once placed in groups, people show a significant shift toward greater gen-
erosity.
This result seems best explained by reference to a social norm, one that
disfavors selfishness, even within a group that stands to benefit from it. If
people are deliberating with others about how much money to give to char-
ity, chances are good that the group will end up being less selfish than the
median individual, simply because people do not want to appear to be
greedy. People's concern for their reputation, along with their concern for
their own self-conception, plays a large role. Of course the outcomes here,
and the effects of group influence, would change if the team in the Dictator
Game had some reason to be hostile to those who would benefit from their
generosity. We can easily imagine a variation of the Dictator Game in
which, for example, people of a relatively poor religious group are deciding
how much to allocate to another religious group that is thought to be both
hostile and far wealthier. In this variation, the social norm would likely fa-
vor greater selfishness.
My point, in short, is that fairness-related behavior is often a function
of prevailing social influences. 0 7 Consider a study of cooperative behavior,
which tested the subjects' willingness to cooperate, varying only the name
of the game.0 8 In one version, the game was called a Wall Street game; in
another, it was called a Community Game. The level of cooperative behav-
ior was far higher in the latter version that in the former. Whether people
will behave fairly, and act to their mutual advantage, is likely to depend on
whether they think that they are playing Wall Street or Community; and
here social signals are crucial.
104 Cason & Mui, supra note 31, at 1468-70.
105 See id
106 Id. at 1468-72.
107 This point is supported by the existence of some cross-cultural differences in fairness-related
behavior. See the overview in Alvin Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 253, 282-88 (John Kagel & Alan Roth eds., 1995).
108 M. Samuels & Lee Ross, Reputations Versus Labels: The Power of Situational Effects in the
Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Lee Ross &
Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflicts and Misunderstand-
ings, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).
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V. CONCLUSION
The cognitive findings emphasized by behavioral economists cannot be
understood in a social vacuum. What is available and what is salient are
products of social interactions. Cascade effects are often responsible for the
spread of instances that eventually become "available" to many or even all.
Frequently group polarization is at work, ensuring that like-minded people
come to focus, and to take as illustrative, a few of countless potential cases.
Many private groups, whether self-interested or public-spirited, are entirely
aware of that fact. They make efforts to spread examples that will, they
hope, serve to drive people's judgments in a particular direction. Many in-
fluential political leaders are masters of this process. Showing intuitive un-
derstandings of the underlying mechanisms, they attempt to make certain
examples vivid and accessible, as a way of moving judgments in one or an-
other direction.
I have also argued that predispositions have a large effect in producing
availability. Of course most predispositions have social foundations. Peo-
ple are predisposed to recall, and to repeat, instances that fortify their ante-
cedent convictions. Those who are predisposed to favor a certain course of
action will naturally recall and stress incidents that support their preferred
plan. Just as predispositions are, in part, a function of availability, so too
availability is, in part, a function of predispositions. Social influences oper-
ate at both levels, affecting what is available and also moving predisposi-
tions in one or another direction. If our goal is to understand the
relationship between law and human behavior, it will be important to know
a great deal more about individual cognition. But it will be equally impor-
tant to see how individual cognition is affected by social interactions.
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